





Exploring the Connection between **Robust** and **Generative** Models

github.com/senad96/Robust-Generative

Senad Beadini Computer Science Department Sapienza, University of Rome*



Iacopo Masi

Computer Science Department Sapienza, University of Rome



* Now at Eustema S.p.a.





Exploring the Connection between Robust and Generative Models









 $\{\mathbf{x}_i\}$





 $\{\mathbf{x}_i\} \sim p_{\text{data}}(\mathbf{x})$





 $\mathbf{x}' \sim p(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\theta}) \ \{\mathbf{x}_i\} \sim p_{\text{data}}(\mathbf{x})$





 $\mathbf{x}' \sim p(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\theta}) \ \{\mathbf{x}_i\} \sim p_{\text{data}}(\mathbf{x})$







$\mathbf{x}' \sim p(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\theta}) \ \{\mathbf{x}_i\} \sim p_{\text{data}}(\mathbf{x})$







$\mathbf{x}' \sim p(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\theta}) \ \{\mathbf{x}_i\} \sim p_{\text{data}}(\mathbf{x})$







 $\mathbf{x}' \sim p(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\theta}) \ \{\mathbf{x}_i\} \sim p_{\text{data}}(\mathbf{x})$











 $p(z|\mathbf{x})$

Inverting a discriminative, robust model















































Robust Model $p(z|\mathbf{x})$





 $\boldsymbol{\delta}^{\star} = rg \max_{||\boldsymbol{\delta}||_{p} < \epsilon} \ell(\boldsymbol{\theta} (\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y)$



Robust Model $p(z|\mathbf{x})$





$$oldsymbol{ heta}^{\star} = rg\min_{oldsymbol{ heta}} \ellig(oldsymbol{ heta}(\mathbf{x} + oldsymbol{\delta}^{\star}), yig)$$
 where
 $oldsymbol{\delta}^{\star} = rg\max_{||oldsymbol{\delta}||_p < \epsilon} \ellig(oldsymbol{ heta}(\mathbf{x} + oldsymbol{\delta}), yig)$



Robust Model $p(z|\mathbf{x})$



θ X

"adversarial training"

$$oldsymbol{ heta}^{\star} = rg\min_{oldsymbol{ heta}} \ellig(oldsymbol{ heta}(\mathbf{x} + oldsymbol{\delta}^{\star}), yig) \quad ext{where} \ oldsymbol{\delta}^{\star} = rg\max_{||oldsymbol{\delta}||_p < \epsilon} \ellig(oldsymbol{ heta}(\mathbf{x} + oldsymbol{\delta}), yig)$$



Robust Model $p(z|\mathbf{x})$



θ

"adversarial training"

$$oldsymbol{ heta}^{\star} = rg\min_{oldsymbol{ heta}} \ellig(oldsymbol{ heta}(\mathbf{x} + oldsymbol{\delta}^{\star}), yig) \quad ext{where} \ oldsymbol{\delta}^{\star} = rg\max_{||oldsymbol{\delta}||_p < \epsilon} \ellig(oldsymbol{ heta}(\mathbf{x} + oldsymbol{\delta}), yig)$$

Decreases the accuracy on natural data



Robust Model $p(z|\mathbf{x})$



A \mathbf{Z}

"adversarial training"

$$oldsymbol{ heta}^{\star} = rg\min_{oldsymbol{ heta}} \ellig(oldsymbol{ heta}(\mathbf{x} + oldsymbol{\delta}^{\star}), yig) \quad ext{where} \ oldsymbol{\delta}^{\star} = rg\max_{||oldsymbol{\delta}||_p < \epsilon} \ellig(oldsymbol{ heta}(\mathbf{x} + oldsymbol{\delta}), yig)$$

Decreases the accuracy on natural data

+ Develops "generative" behavior









 $abla_{\mathbf{x}}\ell_{\mathrm{CE}}(\mathbf{x},z;\boldsymbol{ heta})$





 $abla_{\mathbf{x}}\ell_{\mathrm{CE}}(\mathbf{x},z;\boldsymbol{ heta})$

Standard, non-robust

Wang et al. [4]









 $abla_{\mathbf{x}}\ell_{\mathrm{CE}}(\mathbf{x},z;\boldsymbol{ heta})$

Standard, non-robust

Wang et al. [4] $\ell_2, \epsilon = 0.01$







 $\nabla_{\mathbf{x}} \ell_{\mathrm{CE}}(\mathbf{x}, z; \boldsymbol{\theta})$

Standard, non-robust

"Robust" family

Wang et al. [4]

 $\ell_2, \epsilon = 0.01$

$\ell_2, \epsilon = 0.05$













Why Robust Models behave as Generative?

"energy-based model"

$$p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{\exp\left(-E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})\right)}{P_{\theta}}$$







Why Robust Models behave as Generative?

"energy-based model"

$$p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}) = \frac{\exp\left(-E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})\right)}{P_{\theta}}$$



Classifier

$$p(z = i | \mathbf{x}) = \frac{\exp F_{\theta}(x)[i]}{\sum_{i=1}^{K} \exp F_{\theta}(x)[i]}$$





Why Robust Models behave as Generative?





Joint energy: datum vs label





Why Robust Models behave as Generative?



Joint energy: datum vs label

Marginal: Energy of datum

Why Robust Models behave as Generative?

Joint energy: datum vs label

Marginal: Energy of datum

$$\ell_{\rm CE}(\mathbf{x}, z; \boldsymbol{\theta}) = E(\mathbf{x}, z; \boldsymbol{\theta}) - E(\mathbf{x}; \boldsymbol{\theta})$$

 $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$

 $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$

 $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$

 $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$ "adversarial training"

 $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$



Why Robust Models behave as Generatives?



 $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$



















Finding 1: Untargeted attacks^{*} decrease $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$ thus increase $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$

* Untargeted attack = PGD (Projected Gradient Descent) attack





Finding 1: Untargeted attacks^{*} decrease $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$ thus increase $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$

In other words, untargeted attacks finds points with:

• High energy $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$ thus low $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$

Fool the classifier (known)





Finding 1: Untargeted attacks^{*} decrease $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$ thus increase $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$

In other words, untargeted attacks finds points with:

- High energy $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$ thus low $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$
- Low $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$, highly likely for the model $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$

Fool the classifier (known)

New adversarial points are more likely to exist than the natural data points! (less known)





Finding 1: Untargeted attacks^{*} decrease $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$ thus increase $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$

In other words, untargeted attacks finds points with:

- High energy $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$ thus low $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}, z)$
- Low $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$, highly likely for the model $p_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$

New adversarial points are more likely to exist than the natural data points! (less known)

Fool the classifier (known)



* Untargeted attack = PGD (Projected Gradient Descent) attack









Finding 2: $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$ decreases as the attack "strength" increases

* attack strength= iterations in PGD





Finding 2: $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$ decreases as the attack "strength" increases



^{*} attack strength= iterations in PGD





Finding 2: $E_{\theta}(\mathbf{x})$ decreases as the attack "strength" increases





* attack strength= iterations in PGD





10







10

















10







| Dataset | Defense | Attack | DR | FPR |
|------------|------------|----------|-------|------|
| imagenette | Energy | PGD (8) | 98.24 | 1.37 |
| [8] | (ResNet10) | PGD (16) | 99.6 | 0.00 |







| Dataset | Defense | Attack | DR | FPR |
|------------|------------|----------|-------|------|
| imagenette | Energy | PGD (8) | 98.24 | 1.37 |
| [8] | (ResNet10) | PGD (16) | 99.6 | 0.00 |





| Dataset | Defense | Attack | DR | FPR |
|-------------------|------------|----------|-------|------|
| imagenette | Energy | PGD (8) | 98.24 | 1.37 |
| [8] | (ResNet10) | PGD (16) | 99.6 | 0.00 |
| | Energy | PGD (8) | 98.38 | 1.62 |
| CIFAR- 10 [17] | (ResNet10) | APGD (8) | 85.45 | 1.19 |
| | KD+BU [9] | PGD (8) | 92.27 | 0.96 |
| | LID [21] | PGD (8) | 94.39 | 1.81 |





| Dataset | Defense | Attack | DR | FPR |
|-------------------|------------|----------|-------|------|
| imagenette | Energy | PGD (8) | 98.24 | 1.37 |
| [8] | (ResNet10) | PGD (16) | 99.6 | 0.00 |
| CIFAR- 10 [17] | Energy | PGD (8) | 98.38 | 1.62 |
| | (ResNet10) | APGD (8) | 85.45 | 1.19 |
| | KD+BU [9] | PGD (8) | 92.27 | 0.96 |
| | LID [21] | PGD (8) | 94.39 | 1.81 |





| Dataset | Defense | Attack | DR | FPR |
|-------------------|------------|----------|-------|------|
| imagenette | Energy | PGD (8) | 98.24 | 1.37 |
| [8] | (ResNet10) | PGD (16) | 99.6 | 0.00 |
| CIFAR- 10 [17] | Energy | PGD (8) | 98.38 | 1.62 |
| | (ResNet10) | APGD (8) | 85.45 | 1.19 |
| | KD+BU [9] | PGD (8) | 92.27 | 0.96 |
| | LID [21] | PGD (8) | 94.39 | 1.81 |

Detector may suffer from: (1) targeted attacks (2) AutoAttack





10





Can we bypass the detector?



High-Energy PGD















$$\arg \max_{\boldsymbol{\delta}} \left[\mathcal{L} \big(\boldsymbol{\theta}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}), y \big) + \lambda E_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x} + \boldsymbol{\delta}) \right]$$













$$\mathbf{x}^* = \operatorname{clip}_{\epsilon} \left[\mathbf{x}^* + \alpha \operatorname{sign} \left[\nabla_{\mathbf{x}^*} \mathcal{L} (\boldsymbol{\theta}(\mathbf{x}^*), y) + \lambda E_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}^*) \right] \right]$$



High-Energy PGD



$$\mathbf{x}^* = \operatorname{clip}_{\epsilon} \left[\mathbf{x}^* + \alpha \operatorname{sign} \left[\nabla_{\mathbf{x}^*} \mathcal{L} (\boldsymbol{\theta}(\mathbf{x}^*), y) + \lambda E_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}^*) \right] \right]$$





#

0

-60

-40

E(x)

-20

0





$$\mathbf{x}^{*} = \operatorname{clip}_{\epsilon} \left[\mathbf{x}^{*} + \alpha \operatorname{sign} \left[\nabla_{\mathbf{x}^{*}} \mathcal{L} \left(\boldsymbol{\theta}(\mathbf{x}^{*}), y \right) + \lambda E_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}^{*}) \right] \right]$$





Exploring the Connection between Robust and Generative Models

MAsk-Guided Image Synthesis by Inverting a Quasi-Robust Classifier [AAAI23]

Joint work: Mozhdeh Rouhsedaghat (USC)

Masoud Monajatipoor (UCLA)



Method



segment $\mathbf{x} \xrightarrow{} \mathbf{y}$



Method






Method







Method







Method



















































Manipulation Control – Copy/Move





16











Manipulation Control – Copy/Move







Add



Manipulation Control – Copy/Move









Qualitative Comparison





Qualitative Comparison







Qualitative Comparison













Input



DEEPSIM [5]



MAGIC (Ours)

a)







c)





b)





a)

b)

c)

Qualitative Comparison





d)

e)











Better analyze High-Energy PGD

Investigate same but for targeted attacks





Better analyze High-Energy PGD

Investigate same but for targeted attacks Investigate Hybrid Generative-Discriminative Models





Thank you!